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Abstract
With rapid growth of transportation demands in urban cities, one major challenge is to pro-
vide efficient and effective door-to-door service to passengers using the public transportation
system. This is commonly known as the Last Mile problem. In this thesis, we consider a dy-
namic and demand responsive mechanism for Ridesharing on a non-dedicated commercial fleet
(such as taxis). This problem is addressed as two sub-problems, the first of which is a special
type of vehicle routing problems (VRP). The second sub-problem, which is more challenging,
is to allocate the cost (i.e. total fare) fairly among passengers. We propose auction mechanisms
where we allow passengers to submit their willing payments. We show that our bidding model
is budget-balanced, fairness-preserving, and most importantly, incentive-compatible. We also
show how the winner determination problem can be solved efficiently. A series of experimental
studies are designed to demonstrate the feasibility and efficiency of our proposed mechanisms.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Transportation problems
In recent modern decades, along with explosion of population and rapid motorization, traffic
congestion is rising as an urgent problem in many countries. Direct negative consequences
are cost on wasted energy, travel delay and air pollution. In a statistic provided by Texas
Transportation Institute [36], the cost of wasted fuel and extra time caused by congestion in
urban America increases about 3 times from 21 billion $ in 1982 to 79 billion $ in 2000 and
101 billion $ in 2010. Among causes of congestion, Passenger Vehicle accounts for 74%
of the cost by the statistic in 2010 [36]. In the same report [36], it was shown that without
public transportation, the wasted fuel and time delay could have increased by 17% and 24%
respectively. Consistent with the increasing level of congestion, transport grew fast by the
increase 23.4% from 1990 to 2004 period [21] with 76.2 Mt CO2-e (megatons of carbon dioxide
equivalent) in 2004. Contribution of transportation to global greenhouse gas emissions was just
behind the stationary energy sector’s [21]. Private cars again contributed majority of this figure
with 41.7 Mt CO2-e.
Public transportation infrastructure is constructed and developed in many countries as a so-
lution for handling congestion. To persuade more passengers to take public transport, it is nec-
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essary to provide more comfort and incentives. However, there are many inconveniences that
discourage people from using public transportation. The main source of inconvenience comes
from insufficiency of the service quality. Taking Singapore as an example, the government
is trying to expand and improve current public transport with increasing additional number of
buses from 16,309 in 2010 to 17,241 in 2012 [31]. It was shown in a recent survey of Singapore
passengers on public transportation [30] that the satisfaction index has significantly dropped to
-8.7% for Mass Rapid Transit (MRT, or subway) and -7.2% for public buses from 2011 to 2012.
In another report [31], it reveals that private cars population keeps increasing by 13 thousands
from 2011 to 2012 in comparison to 8 thousands from 2010 to 2011. It seems that the effort at
improving public transport has yet to meet passenger expectations.
1.2 Ridesharing
The high ownership and use private cars for commuting are the main cause of congestion and
air pollution. By The International Energy Agency’s (IEA) forecast [20], from 2000 to 2050,
car ownership in Asian developing countries could grow about twenty-fold. Beside causing
traffic problems, it raises issues of land for parking, energy and natural resource for car man-
ufacturing. Policy makers and transportation planners can encourage people to limit the use
of private cars by devising good trip sharing plans and providing strong public transportation
benefits.
Ridesharing is considered as an efficient measure to limit use of single-occupancy vehicles.
Ridesharing entails the formation of trips by at least 2 passengers in a vehicle. It takes many
forms: taxi sharing, carpooling, van pooling, private shuttle, etc. It could be recurring trips with
long term commitment between passengers or one time shared trip between strangers. Beside
the feature of small size vehicle (vs mass transport in public transportation individual routing
and cost splitting makes ridesharing more passenger-oriented and distinguished from public
transportation. In ridesharing, the group trip planning and execution is based on passenger
demands. As the trip is designed to pick up and deliver passengers at (or close to) passen-
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gers’ beginning and ending points, ridesharing provides a door-to-door service which is more
convenient than public transportation.
Ridesharing is not a new idea. In the US, its first success story dates back to the 19th cen-
tury with Jitney Craze and World War II. Ridesharing was restored by the US government
during the energy crisis in the 1970’s [6]. Recently with economic recession and more con-
cern about the environmental and congestion issues, ridesharing has been promoted by the
US and European governments with many trial systems, for example German Flexible Op-
erations Command and Control System (FOCCS), San Francisco Bay-area Ride Now, Euro-
pean Commission OPTI-TRANS, Smart Traveler in the U.S, etc [6]. Some companies even
tried to encourage employees to travel more with ridesharing to receive monthly incentive
gifts [35]. To facilitate matching of individual travellers for ridesharing, many web-based
and mobile applications have emerged. Interested readers may refer to some popular web-
sites http://www.carpoolworld.com/, http://www.myridebuddy.com/, or recently launched apps
in Singapore http://www.gomywayapp.com/, http://www.split-it.sg/.
Beside positive social effects on road congestion, air pollution and energy resources,
ridesharing incentivizes passengers by monetary benefit, especially in the economics reces-
sion and fuel crisis [6],[35]. Besides being a door-to-door service, it is much cheaper than
private cars because the fuel cost of hired vehicles is fairly split among passengers. However,
ridesharing might be less attractive than private cars because of additional travel distance and
discomfort of sharing cars with strangers. The additional travel distance is inevitable in some
cases in which the detour is necessary to serve different locations in the same trip.
1.3 First Mile and Last Mile problems and solutions
The segment incurred by public transport passengers from their homes to the nearest public
transport (bus/train) station and vice versa is known as ”First Mile” and ”Last Mile” (LM) re-
spectively. This inconvenience is often a major deterrence in utilizing public transport services.
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A transportation solution to fill this First (Last) Mile gap is not easy. Expanding the bus and
train network is long term and complicated problem. It is economically inefficient to design
frequent routes to cover every residence, especially for underpopulated regions or to handle
dynamic demands.
A straightforward idea to satisfy the LM demands is to establish a service fleet for each
major transport hub. However, due to the fact that the demands for the LM transportation are
irregular and distributed (both spatially and temporally), having a fixed-size service fleet is
infeasible, for the following intuitive reasons:
1. Demands are highly irregular and uncertain. Therefore, to ensure that the fleet can cope
with peaks in demands, the fleet has to run with spare capacity that would be underuti-
lized most of times.
2. To ensure reasonable quality of service, the routes of the fleet have to sufficiently cover
most of the service area (the travel time from any point in the area to the closest
stop should be within certain minutes) with reasonable service intervals (this constrains
longest waiting time). The fleet can operate statically with fixed routes, or it can operate
dynamically with routes depending on passengers onboard; however, in either case, sig-
nificant slacks have to be introduced in the fleet so as to handle the spatial and temporal
demand uncertainties.
Due to the above issues, operating fixed-size fleets is cost-ineffective for most occasions
except for the very limited cases where demands are consistently high.
A powerful idea in addressing unpredictable travel demands is sharing, or resource pool-
ing. For example, in many European countries, the bike sharing [38] and car sharing [44],
[37] schemes have been suggested as a way to bridge the gaps of public transport. In these
instances, resources (bikes and cars) are pooled at fixed locations, and travelers will grab re-
sources, if needed, to complete their travels. Resources are pooled and resource utilizations are
independent. Ridesharing (car-pooling or taxi-pooling) is a such typical case.
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Ridesharing provides an effective solution to solve this problem, typically with taxi-pooling
for urban Asian cities like Singapore where the number of taxis is significantly large [31] in
comparison with the size of public transportation. Statistically, over 50% of the time, a taxi is
spent on idling (i.e. empty cruising or waiting in queues). The availability of taxis can be a
potential support for a ridesharing solution to solve the Last (First) Mile problem. Especially a
non-dedicated taxi system is efficient to cope with the dynamic demand nature of the problem,
where drivers are called only by demanded and do not have to commit any recurring trip plan.
1.4 Mechanisms for Last Mile Ridesharing
In this thesis, we study the problem of ridesharing with a non-dedicated taxi fleet to solve
the Last Mile problem. Given a batch of arriving passengers and a set of available taxis near
the station, we need to design ridesharing trips and specify the fares of riders. For the sake
of simplicity henceforth, we will refer this problem as the Taxi Sharing Last Mile problem (or
simply Last Mile Problem).
The Last Mile problem contains 2 sub-problems: routing and cost allocation (or cost shar-
ing). Complete solutions for the Last Mile problem need to provide the routes for the taxi fleet
as well as the fare payment for passengers. In this thesis, we design market mechanisms to
produce those solutions. More precisely, we consider two aspects in mechanisms design:
• From the routing standpoint, our problem is a special case of the Dial-a-Ride vehicle
routing problems (DARPs). We derive an exact model from existing DARP models.
We solve the routing problem with a specific objective function. The efficiency of our
modified model is improved in comparison to the original one by leveraging the special
structure of small capacity and other taxi-related constraints. To handle large scale prob-
lem instances, we propose heuristic algorithms, i.e. Tabu search and randomized search.
Their solutions yield a small gap in comparison with exact method’s solutions, and is
capable of returning solutions in real-time, which is an important characteristic to make
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this approach operationally viable.
• To incentivize passengers to join ridesharing services, the fares should be fair and com-
petitive. Acknowledging the heterogeneity of passengers joining the ridesharing service,
we design protocol that allow passengers to specify their willing payments. In particular,
we design an auction protocol where Last Mile passengers submit not only their desti-
nations but also the willing payment to use the sharing service. The allocation of cost
(payment) need not only to be operational optimum but also sustainable under passen-
gers’ rationality. Specifically, mechanisms are designed to be incentive compatible, i.e.
there would be no incentive for passengers to be dishonest in disclosing their bid infor-
mation. The general principle of our incentive compatible mechanisms is that passengers
with high willing payment will have more chance to be served than low willing payment
passengers.
In summary, the main purpose of this research is to study and propose mechanisms for
the Last Mile problem. We need to compute solutions efficiently, and the mechanism must
be fair and incentive compatible. In this thesis, we show theoretical properties of proposed
mechanisms. Feasibility and efficiency of mechanisms are measured by a series of experiments.
For the sake of simplicity, in this thesis we assume the vehicle’s velocity to be equal to 1, the
meter rate of running the service to be 1. Hence, the travel distance is also equal to the travel
time and driver’s revenue. For real world implementations, it is straightforward to incorporate
constant parameters and compute these values by linear transformation.
1.5 Thesis Structure
The structure of my thesis is as follows:
• The literature review on vehicle routing and cost sharing is given in chapter 2. We present
vehicle routing models which are applicable to the routing problem in taxi sharing. For
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the cost sharing problem, we consider existing cost sharing approaches in vehicle routing
as well as in other game settings. For each approach, we discuss the feasibility and
drawback of applying to our Last Mile Ridesharing problem.
• In chapter 3, we propose and develop a Mixed Integer Program (MIP) and Local Search
models to solve routing problem. An MIP model is considered to provide exact solution
for Last Mile problem. However, MIP model is infeasible to handle large scale problems.
Therefore, an heuristic search algorithm is developed to provide routing solutions in real
time.
• A bidding protocol and cost sharing models with discount part are proposed in chapter 4.
After analyzing pros and cons of each model, we choose the bidding protocol of meter
rate and set the discount rate capped by meter rate. In this chapter, we also propose
an optimal mechanism to produce the optimistic solution as a benchmark for incentive
compatible mechanisms.
• We propose incorporated mechanisms for our cost sharing problem in chapter 5
– Top-down mechanism solution is a baseline of incentive compatible mechanisms.
– Bottom-up mechanism is an advanced version of Top-down mechanism.
– Raising cost mechanism provides solution by differentiating meter rate of passen-
gers.
Routing models of these mechanisms have nonlinear objective function, which make
problem unsolvable by normal MIP model. We propose a hill climbing search method to
efficiently compute solutions of mechanisms.
• Chapter 6 contains experimental results of proposed mechanisms. We measure efficiency
of mechanisms using synthetic and real data sets. With focus on maximizing the number
of served passengers and total direct distance of served demands for large scale prob-
lems, we experiment on our Bottom-up mechanism with Local Search algorithm. The
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experimental results in real data show this approach is promising to serve almost all Last
Mile demands.
• Chapter 7 is a summary of our contribution in this thesis and discussion of future work
in implementing Ridesharing service for the Last Mile problem, including user interface
and usability.
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Chapter 2
Literature review
In this chapter, we review existing works in three aspects of Ridesharing:
• In the first section, we review some existing ridesharing systems, including mobile or
e-ticket platforms for riders. We also report some contemporary results from different
implementations of Ridesharing systems.
• In operations research, Ridesharing is considered as a special class of vehicle routing or
traveling salesman problem. The challenge is to design routes for vehicles (in real time).
We review mixed integer programming and heuristic methods to solve the problem.
• In cost sharing aspect, Ridesharing is associated with several popular game-theoretical
concepts, e.g. coalition, Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) and auction mechanisms. In this
thesis, we develop auction based mechanisms for Last Mile Ridesharing problem, so the
review on cost sharing in this aspect will be presented.
2.1 Ridesharing Systems
In a recent survey on ridesharing [4], the authors defined several special characteristics,
which are applied into our Last Mile taxi sharing service.
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Dynamic Ridesharing planning is triggered by real-time demands of passengers. In our Last
Mile taxi sharing problem, passengers send their requests a short period before arrivals.
Future demands are not known apriori.
Cost-sharing A taxi sharing mechanism needs to provide a complete solution for each batch
of passengers, which contains both the routes and the cost allocation.
Non-recurring trips Trips are non-recurring, which is different from standard vehicle routing
problem where vehicles return to the depot after each round.
Automated matching The center system automatically provides solutions that assign each
passenger to a taxi. The computation needs to be fast and reliable.
Combining trains with taxi sharing to serve the last mile is not a new idea. In fact, the
concept of a demand adaptive system was first studied in [13] in which the authors suggested
the combination of flexible line and conventional swift lines (train and express bus) to increase
the coverage of the transportation system. They proposed an operational planning model to
seamlessly connect the long distance transportation with flexible vehicles. Our taxi sharing
solution is a variant of this demand adaptive concept, in which non-dedicated taxis play the
role of a flexible line.
There are many studies on the technology side of ridesharing platforms. In [19], authors
reported their work on construction of an efficient database structure to handle cab-sharing
demand queries. Amey in [7] studied different problems and solutions of utilizing mobile phone
technology in real time ridesharing. The paper [34] introduced an incorporated mobile context-
based ridesharing platform named WEtransport which facilitated passengers to find ride-mates
and share the train ticket or taxi fare. Authors in [43] showed a social media framework to
support dynamic ridesharing scheme. The paper [41] introduced an agent-based ridesharing
architecture via lightweight devices like mobile phones. As a special ridesharing service, Last
Mile taxi sharing can inherit most of these existing technologies with some light modification
or extension.
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To prove the feasibility and effectiveness of ridesharing, researchers study implementation
of ridesharing by different methods. Some researches verify ridesharing services under a sim-
ulation environment [5],[9]. Simulation data from matching personal drivers and riders shown
in [5] demonstrated a potential and sustainable success of dynamic ridesharing. Focusing on
taxi sharing, [9] reported his work on collective taxi system implementation at large scale in
different models, including Last Mile transportation.
Success and failure factors of ridesharing raise an interesting research topic in ridesharing.
Based on a survey about an implemented Carsharing service in Lisbon, [12] used a discrete
choice model to recognize factors affecting ridesharing the most. To address the problem from
the policy maker perspective, [6] showed the current trend of ridesharing by analyzing different
implemented ridesharing schemes in Europe and the US. This work provided a detailed analysis
of economics and social effects of ridesharing. In addition, it also suggested some solutions to
improve and establish ridesharing services in the future.
2.2 Vehicle Routing Problems
Given a set of passengers and taxis, the goal of vehicle routing is to assign each passenger
to a specific taxi and design a route for each taxi that optimizes a particular objective function.
Common objectives in ridesharing routing are to minimize the total travel time/distance T =∑
i,j xijtij and maximize the number of served customers
∑
i,j xij [4].
The routing sub-problem of our Last Mile problem is a specific instance of vehicle routing in
Dial-a-Ride settings [27]. Dial-a-Ride is a demand-responsive system to provide door-to-door
service with specific requirements on passenger’s pickup and delivery locations and times. It
comprises personal cars, vans or small buses in response to calls from passengers [29]. Dial-
a-Ride problems (DARPs) belong to a class of vehicle routing problems with capacity and
time window constraints. A detailed summary of characters and classification of Dial-a-Ride
problem can be found in the review [10].
11
Similar to other NP-hard problems in vehicle routing, there is no efficient method to
solve Dial-a-Ride routing problem. [17] modelled a generic Dial-a-Ride routing problem by
mixed integer program (MIP) model and applied different subtour elimination constraints to
strengthen the LP-relaxation of MIP. For the identical vehicle case where vehicle capacities are
the same, [33] proposed a simplified version of [17]. However, [33] requires to enumerate a
large number of subset constraints, which is not necessary in our model.
For complicated and large scale instances in which exact methods like MIP fail to obtain
a solution in real time, heuristic and meta-heuristic methods are utilized. Studying DARPs,
[11] proposed a Tabu search procedure to find locally optimal solutions, in which routing so-
lutions were represented by ordered route vectors. In each local search iteration, the algorithm
removed a pickup and delivery pair in one link and simply inserted into another link, with or-
ders for other passengers were reserved. To gain diversity, they relaxed the time and capacity
constraint by adding a penalty element into objective function. It is different from our local
search procedure presented later. In our method, we do not represent routing solution in form
of ordered routes but we consider cluster assignment (passenger-taxi) vectors. As a suitable
local search operator is defined, the feasibility of solution is preserved over local moves. A
genetic method for solving Dial-a-Ride problem is proposed in [23]. To solve DARPs by ge-
netic algorithm, [23] proposed genetic operators in cluster vectors, where each element was
index of passenger assigned to that cluster. Based on the same cluster structure, [46] proposed
a simulated annealing algorithm and they reported that their algorithm produced better results
than Tabu search [11].
Recently, [27] provided a summary of recent Dial-a-Ride algorithms to apply in ridesharing
taxi. From this summary, we notice special structural characteristics of specific systems like
taxi system was not addressed. We show in this thesis that adaptation and modification from
generic models are essential to reduce the complexity for our sub problems, i.e. taxi routing.
One example is reduction of redundant vehicle index variables. In addition, we can simplify
pickup constraints into single pickup point because in our cases passengers arrive the same hub
at the same time. In the next chapter, the detail of modification will be presented and integrated
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into our Last Mile taxi sharing problem.
2.3 Cost sharing in vehicle routing problem
Although the vehicle routing problem has a long history in operations research, the study
of cost sharing has just drawn attraction very recently as an application of game theory. This
section is aimed to briefly introduce some techniques on recent works related to our cost sharing
problem.
2.3.1 Coalition mechanisms
The coalition value is a fundamental notion in cooperative game theory. It is the optimal
cost or utility created by cooperation of a group of players. The core of a game is ideal solution
for all players such that value of any group of players is not less than coalition value of it [40].
Formally, the coalition value is represented by a characteristic function as the cost or utility
to serve each set (or coalition) of players v : 2N → R. The core is the cost allocation∑i∈N pi =
v(N) for all players such that there is not any of its subset value dominated by corresponding
coalition value, in other words
∀S ∈ N, v(S) ≥
∑
i∈S
pi. (2.1)
Core solution
The core value is suggested to be directly used to charge passengers in vehicle routing
[15],[42]. To find core solution in vehicle routing game, a popular method is to use constraint
generation procedure to iteratively solve the problem [15], [18]. Although core solution is ideal
for cost allocating problem, there is no guarantee for existence of such solution in general ve-
hicle routing game [42]. In some cases, we can only find an approximation core [16] instead,
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which is solution only recovering part of the service cost. In non-dedicated taxi service, trading
off budget balance to get approximation solution is infeasible because taxi driver needs to get
a sufficient amount from passengers to run the service.
Shapley solution
Another popular cost allocation method in cooperative game is Shapley value which is av-
erage marginal cost over all coalition [39]
pi =
∑
S∈N\i
|S|!(n− |S| − 1)!
n!
(v(S ∪ i)− v(S)), (2.2)
in which v(S) is the coalition value of coalition S.
The Shapley value is well known as a solution satisfying 4 Shapley axioms: budget balance,
symmetry, linearity, zero player. In contrast to non-existence of core value in some cases,
Shapley value always exists in any cooperative game. Shapley value is suggested to be used in
vehicle routing game to allocate the service cost to passengers[15], [45].
2.3.2 Auction based mechanism
One of the shortcomings of conventional cost allocation mechanisms is the disregard for
heterogeneous utility of passengers. In our taxi sharing problem, different routing solutions
make passengers ”suffer” various extra travel distances. Moreover, passengers also have differ-
ent utlity functions: some of them could require high compensation for extra travel distances;
some of them could have low willing payment with the sharing service.
Given a set of available resources and willing payment of each passenger to use the service,
auction based cost sharing studies how to distribute service and allocate the cost between served
passengers. It requires a bidding protocol, where each passenger (or player) needs to submit not
only her/his demand but also the willing payment. The common desirable property of auction
based mechanisms is strategyproofness, which ensure a passenger to not have benefit to be
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dishonest about the bid information.
VCG mechanism
The VCG price scheme charges player by the marginal benefit he/she contributes into the
service. This value is calculated for each player in game by formula pi = (V−i)∗ − V ∗i where
V ∗−i is total social benefit of all passenger minus social benefit of i in optimal solution for grand
set N , and (V−i)∗ is the total social benefit of optimal solution of subset N \ i. This value can
be simply characterized as coalition value.
Studying cost allocation in ridesharing, [24] proposed a VCG based mechanism to provide
cost allocation for ridesharing participants. Although VCG is a truthful and budget balance
scheme, it is not budget balancing. [24] tried to recover budget balance by trading off truthful-
ness and claimed that it was reasonable under bounded rationality. ”Semi” truthful and approx-
imated budget balance can make non-dedicated taxi sharing service unstable for our Last Mile
problem.
Second price based mechanism
In [26], Kleiner et al. proposed strategyproof auction based mechanism for ridesharing,
where passengers submit their bids on willing payment to share the car with the driver. They
provided a modified second-price auction mechanism which picked up the highest rank pas-
senger that maximized benefit for driver then it charged the passenger a cost of the second
highest bid. This modified second price auction mechanism is incentive compatible. Despite
having this good property, this mechanism cannot apply to our problem because it is limited in
bilateral scenario with matching algorithm to output solutions for pairwise driver-passenger. In
our taxi sharing problem, we are challenged by clustering passengers in respect to their willing
payment and spatial relation. In our Top-down and Bottom-up mechanisms described later,
we modify the idea of second-price auction schema by setting a lower bound of first unserved
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passenger, corresponding to the second highest cost in the second price auction, to the cost of
served passengers.
Raising cost mechanisms
Auction based mechanisms are studied in many game settings before vehicle routing appli-
cation. Among them, set cover game [14] is considered as a general combinatorial game setting
for different problems, where it requires different costs for different subsets of passengers. In
fact, vehicle routing can be modeled as a set covering problem [25], in which each cluster with
optimal routing is corresponding to a subset in set covering.
A popular technique used to solve these cost sharing problems is the cost raising procedure
([14],[32]) which often guarantees strategyproofness. In addition, the raising cost procedure
could be combined with other techniques like primal-dual [28] or ”ghost processing” [32] to
obtain the core solution or cross monotonic property but it usually needs to replace the budget
balance by some approximations, which recover only a fraction of the service cost, for example
in set covering it is only 1/Hn, Hn is harmony number [14], in facility location it is one third of
the cost [14]. Although approximation budget balance could help to gain interesting properties,
it would be unrealistic in implementing of non-dedicated taxis because taxi driver will not agree
to run the service unless money from passenger is sufficient. Therefore in non-dedicated taxi
context, we focus on designing a strategyproof and budget balance solution, which recovers
full service cost, rather than property of approximation budget balance solution.
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Chapter 3
Taxi Sharing Routing Problem
Given a set of passenger demand and available taxi, routing is the problem of finding effi-
cient trip to optimize an objective function. In this chapter, we study different routing solutions
for taxis routing problem in Last Mile ridesharing service. A Mixed Integer Program (MIP)
is adapted from DARPs model to provide exact solution for the problem. We show modifica-
tion from original model to fit into specific domain and improve the scalability of the model.
Although the new MIP is more scalable in comparison with its origin, it is still infeasible to
handle large scale problem, i.e. instances with number of passengers above 32. Observe this
limit of MIP, we propose a heuristic local search algorithm to provide solution in real time.
3.1 Mixed Integer Programming (MIP) Formulation
3.1.1 Last Mile routing problem and DARP
Given a set of pickup and delivery locations and their time windows, and a set of vehicle and
their capacities, DARP is the problem of designing routes for the vehicle fleet to serve as many
transport demands as possible. Routing in our Last Mile problem is a sub-problem of DARP,
which could be optimized by eliminating redundant variables:
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– Since the capacity of each taxi is assumed to be homogeneous, which is 4 (seats) in a
normal taxi, it is possible to not enumerate the taxi index. Consequently, a large number
of variables related to the taxi index can be simplified. Under this simplification to keep
track of the sequence of serving order we could use an additional variable ai .
– There is no time window constraint in our Last Mile problem. However to control the
inconvenience caused by addition travel distance we need a variable to measure individ-
ual travel distance in the trip. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that travel time is
equivalent to travel distance, i.e. velocity of taxi equal to 1.
– In a non-dedicated taxi system, after finishing the trip, taxi drivers could have flexible
options of roaming or trip pick up instead of the obligation to return to depot. Hence we
plan one way trip instead of round trip.
3.1.2 Clustering Constraints
Let N denote the set of passenger demands and K be available vehicles, each with capacity
Q. The Last Mile routing problem is defined as a graph with depot and destinations as vertices
{0, 1, . . . , |N|}. An edge in the graph between 2 nodes i and j is weighted by the travel distance
tij between 2 locations.
To express the connection of 2 nodes in planned trips we use binary indicator
xij =

0 if there is no trip traveling directly to j from i
1 if there is trip traveling directly to j from i.
(3.1)
Let Bi, si denote individual trip travel distance and direct travel distance from depot (vertex 0)
to passenger destination i.
To produce a valid ridesharing trip, the following constraints have to be satisfied [8]:
∑
i∈N
xij ≤ 1,∀j ∈ N, (3.2)
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∑
j∈N
xij ≤ 1,∀we ∈ N, (3.3)
∑
j∈N
xij ≤
∑
h∈N
xhi,∀i ∈ N, (3.4)
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N
xij ≤ min{|N |, K ×Q}, (3.5)
∑
j∈N
x0j ≤ |K|, (3.6)
Bj ≥ Bi + tij −M (1− xij) ,∀i, j ∈ N, (3.7)
Bj ≤ Bi + tij +M (1− xij) , ∀i, j ∈ N, (3.8)
Bj ≥ 0,∀j ∈ N, (3.9)
a0 = 0, (3.10)
aj ≥ ai + 1−M(1− xij),∀i, j ∈ N, (3.11)
aj ≤ ai + 1 +M(1− xij),∀i, j ∈ N, (3.12)
ai ≤ Q, ∀we ∈ N, (3.13)
xij ∈ {0, 1},∀i, j ∈ N (3.14)
(3.15)
• ∑i∈N∑j∈N xij in (3.5) quantifies total number of served passengers. ∑j∈N x0j in (3.6)
is number of vehicles departing from Depot.
• Constraints (3.2) and (3.3) limits at most 1 arrival and 1 departure at each passenger
vertex in the graph, consequently each passenger is served by at most 1 time by 1 vehicle.
The in-out constraint (3.4) ensures vehicle departs from i only if it arrived i.
Passenger j is served if there is trip traveling to her/him, or ∃i, xij = 1.
• Inequalities (3.7) and (3.8) are linearization from the sequencing constraint
Bj = xij(Bi + tij), (3.16)
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which implies that the trip travel distance of passenger j is the sum of her/his direct
predecessor’s travel distance and the travel distance from that predecessor. This relation
is expressed by inequality (3.7) and (3.8) with big constant M to relax the bound for Bj
if i is not a predecessor of j or tighten the bound otherwise.Particularly, when there is
a trip traveling from i to j, M (1− xij) is zero, combination of (3.7) and (3.8) directly
leads to (3.16).
• Variable aj is introduced to specify service order of passenger, e.g. if j is the first passen-
ger arriving the final destination then aj = 1, if he/she is the second one then aj = 2 and
so on. Similarly to Bj variable, (3.11) and (3.12) are linearization of service sequence
constraint
aj = xij(ai + 1) (3.17)
meaning that service order of j is greater than service order of its predecessor by 1.
The original model in DARPs uses the vehicle index k in xkij to decide which vehicle will
serve the trip directly traveling from i to j. Vehicle capacity constraint can be modeled
by
∑
i,j∈N x
k
ij ≤ Qk,∀k, in which Qk is capacity of vehicle k. With assumption of
homogeneous taxi vehicle, we discard vehicle index to reduce the complexity of the
problem. Under this simplification, we express the capacity constraint in another way
by the length of service sequence or maxj∈N aj in inequality (3.13). It implies that the
service order of any passenger cannot exceed the capacity of taxi. By removing vehicle
index and using service order variable, we reduce number variable from (|N|2 × K) of
xkij variables to (|N|2 + N) of xij and aj variables. This reduction results in improvement
of runtime in comparison with original formula.
Quality of routing solutions
There are some common criteria to measure the quality of a routing solution:
• In term of social welfare, we consider the objective function to maximize the total number
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of served demand. If there is more than one routing solution to serve the same number of
passengers, the mathematics model would give priority to serve passengers with further
destinations. This objective can be quantified by
max
∑
i,j∈N
xij +
1
M
∑
i,j∈N
xijsj, (3.18)
in which
∑
i,j∈N xij is the total number of served passengers,
∑
i,j∈N xijsj is total direct
distance of corresponding served demand. M is a big value to calibrate second term to
set priority to first term.
• Minimizing travel cost is preferred by both passengers and transportation planner. It is
usually related to minimize total travel distance
∑
i,j∈N xijtij and minimize extra travel
distance
∑
j∈N(Bj − sj).
• Sometimes, worst case criteria are considered. This quality of transport service can be
measured by ratio between real travel distance and direct travel distance α = maxi∈N Bisi .
To improve quality of transportation, one can think of minimizing this α ration.
Modified MIP model experimental result
To verify improvement of our MIP model over original DARP model, we carry on exper-
iment to find solution minimizing travel cost
∑
i,j∈N xijtij +
∑
j∈N(Bj − sj) under different
problem sizes, i.e. 8, 20, 24, 32 passengers and the number of taxis is 4, 5, 6, 8 respectively.
Riders Drivers Time / Time using
DARP Model
8 4 0.37s / 43s
20 5 24.06s / 3m14s
24 6 1m24s /
no result after 3h
32 8 17m22 /
no result after 1d
Table 3.1: Summary of the LM planning results for different problem sizes (all ∆i are set to 1).
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Table 3.1 summarizes the performance statistics we obtain under different problem sizes.
The first thing to note is the significantly improved solution speed. For the largest instance, our
simplified model returns solution within 17.5 minutes, while the classical DARP MIP model
runs over one day without terminating. For all instances, our formulation is at least two orders
of magnitude faster than the classical DARP MIP model.
3.2 Local search algorithm
MIP is a popular model to produce exact solution for linear problem. However, for problems
with large number of variables and constraints, MIP is inefficient and unrealistic in real time
computing system because it may take runtime of hours or days period to output final solutions.
Alternative solutions from heuristic algorithms are useful in these cases. In this section, we
propose a heuristic local search algorithm with random initial start point.
Our local search algorithm contains 2 phases: clustering and routing. The first phase is to
specify the cluster of passengers, i.e. each passenger is assigned to a taxi. In second phase,
from each cluster the detailed trip for each taxi is computed by exhaustively searching over
all possible permutations. Since the capacity of taxis is small (typically 4), the number of
permutations is scalable, e.g. 4! = 24, which makes exhaustive search become an efficient
method to produce solution in short runtime. To avoid recalculating the best permutation for
the same cluster many times, in our implementation we use a hash data structure to store the
best permutation for the corresponding cluster after each calculation.
Our local search algorithm is developed to solve 2 types of routing problems in our proposed
mechanisms in Chapter 5
• to serve a given number of passengers. These solutions are meant for the ideal optimality
and Bottom-Up mechanism.
• to serve some additional passengers and a fixed set of passengers. These solutions are
meant for the Raising Cost mechanism.
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3.2.1 Solution Structure
A local search solution is defined by k clusters corresponding to the k available taxis, each
cluster contains a maximum of 4 elements corresponding to the taxi capacity. This cluster
structure is dynamic in that elements can be added or removed from the cluster with constraint
on capacity. An example of a local search solution is shown in Figure 3.1. From the cluster
solution, we will compute the optimal route by exhaustive search over all permutations of
elements within the cluster.
6 3 1 
2 7 8 5 
4 9 
Vehicle 1 
Vehicle 2 
Vehicle 3 
1 ----- 6 ----- 3 
7 ----- 2 ----- 5 ----- 8 
4 ----- 9 
2 permutations 
4! permutations 
3! permutations 
Cluster Phase Routing Phase 
Figure 3.1: An example of Local Search.
3.2.2 Local Search algorithm
We propose a local search shown in Algorithm 1.
To explore the search space, we define the ”Shuffle” operator as shown in Procedure 21 and
illustrated in Figure 3.2. The Shuffle({v(i)v(j)}) operator returns the best clusters formed
by elements of 2 clusters i and j. First, it forms a list of passengers {p1, . . . , pk} from these 2
clusters. Then it computes all bi-partitions from this list to find the best bi-partition. In example
3.2, apply Shuffle() to vehicle 2 and 3, a list of passengers {2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9} of vehicle 2 and 3
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Algorithm 1: Local Search algorithm
1 Initialize: v(1, . . . , k) = ranInit(N);
2 while (stop condition != false) do
3 for i← 1 to k do
4 for j ← i+ 1 to k do
5 v
′
= Shuffle({v(i)v(j)});
6 if computeCost(v′) < computeCost(v) then
7 v = v
′;
8 break;
9 end
10 end
11 end
12 end
is formed. A pool of
(
7
4
)
combinations is enumerated. The best partition is chosen.
The local search algorithm begins with a randomly initialized solution then improves its so-
lution by finding first improvement by the Shuffle operator in each step. We iteratively explore
all pairs of 2 clusters to check if there is any improvement by applying Shuffle(). The local
search terminates when the maximum time elapses or when it reaches a local optimum. To
enhance the chance to reach an optimal solution, we diversify local search solutions by parallel
runs with independently random initial solutions.
6 3 1 
2 7 8 5 
4 9 
4 8 2 
5 7 9 
{2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9} 
O(𝐶7
4) bi-partitions 
Shuffle 
Figure 3.2: Shuffle Operator.
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Procedure Shuffle({p1, . . . , pk})
13 mbest =∞;
14 vbest = v;
15 forall the [c1, c2] = partition({p1, . . . , pk}) do
16 m = computeCost(c1, c2);
17 if m < mbest then
18 Update vbest with [c1, c2];
19 end
20 end
21 return vbest;
By exploiting structure of small capacity taxi to use the exhaustive search for each cluster,
our local search algorithm can produce a solution almost the same as optimal solution produced
by an exact method within a short time. The experimental results for local search algorithm
can be found in chapter 6.
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Chapter 4
Cost Allocation Model
Cost allocation is a critical part to ensure participation in ridesharing. By participating in
ridesharing, passengers expect to get incentivized by a fairly distributed service cost. The
payment of passengers should be aligned with their service utility. More challenging is the
heterogeneity of passengers, in other words, passengers may have different utilities or willing
payments on the travel service. In this chapter, we consider 2 problems: how to quantify cost di-
vision in regard to passengers’ inconvenience and how to serve passengers with heterogeneous
willing payment. For the cost division problem, we propose a linear cost allocating formula
for ridesharing passengers which combines cost for direct travel and discount for additional
distance. To address heterogeneity of passengers’ willing payments, we propose and study
several auction based protocols to elicit passenger willing payment. Among auction based pro-
tocol schemes, the meter rate bidding protocol is shown as a suitable scheme for our Last Mile
problem.
4.1 Budget balance constraint
The Cost allocation problem needs to take into consideration the perspective of the taxi
driver and the passengers. In this thesis, we consider solutions in which taxi drivers will get
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at least the amount as usual taxi service to run assigned route and this amount of money is
directly paid by passengers. In the other words, the routing problem is constrained by the
following budget balance condition:
∑
i∈S
pi ≥
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N
xijtij, (4.1)
in which
∑
i∈S pi is the sum of payment of served passenger. This total payment is at least total
travel distance of taxi fleet T =
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N xijtij in the RHS. For the sake of simplicity, in
this paper we consider simple linear cost function to interpret distance traveled T into revenue
with 1$ for 1 travel distance. Other fare formula in real implementation can be scaled by linear
transforms.
In our routing model, since we simplify the taxi index k, there is no direct translation from
total payment to single taxi payment. Instead, we need a separate phase to derive the single taxi
portion ck directly allocated based on travel distance of taxi k.
Notice that this assumption of budget balance is flexible to be adapted to other settings with
monetary subsidy from the policy maker.
4.2 Cost sharing formula
A ride-sharing trip (or simply trip) is made up of a set of passengers assigned to a particular
vehicle. The direct distance of a passenger refers to the distance the passenger will incur if he
travels alone on the vehicle. Given a fixed trip comprising a number of passengers, the cost
sharing problem is the problem of allocating cost (payment) to the passengers on this trip.
A usual method in some situations is to minimize total travel distance T and charge passen-
ger proportionally to their direct distances [5]: pi = T × si∑
h sh
, where pi and si are the payment
and direct travel distance of passenger we respectively, and the denominator is the sum over all
served passengers’ direct travel distances. A flaw in this proportional cost formula is disregard
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of discount for extra travel distance, as a result of sharing the trip with other passengers. It is
unfair (except for the first passenger arriving home) that some passengers travel longer than
their direct distance due to the detour to serve the precedent passengers, but they do not receive
any additional discount for this detour. Indeed, this extra travel distance makes ridesharing less
attractive than normal taxi mode [22].
In order to compensate for this extra travel distance, we propose a new fare structure which
gives passengers discounts that are proportional to their extra travel distance. Let m denote
meter rate i.e. fare per unit of direct travel distance; Bi denotes trip travel distance of passenger
i. The revised formula is given by:
pi = msi −∆(Bi − si). (4.2)
In the first term on the RHS msi is the direct cost, which is proportional to direct distance si to
passenger i’s destination. In the second term ∆ is the discount rate for each unit of additional
travel distance which is (Bi − si), and Bi is the actual travel distance in the trip.
By this payment formula (4.2), the budget balance constraint (4.1) can be rewritten as
∑
i∈S
msi −∆(Bi − si) ≥
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N
xijtij, (4.3)
4.3 Auction protocol
Auction protocols in ridesharing were recently introduced in [26]. In the request for a shared
ride, besides the demand information on arrival time and destination, the auction protocol al-
lows riders to specify their willing payment. The planned trip is not only dependent on the
demand information but also passengers’ willing payments. For example, in [26], a driver will
go with the highest ranked passengers computed based on a weighted sum of willing payment
and detour distance.
The cost sharing formula given in (4.2) can be directly applied to homogeneous passengers.
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However, given the fact of heterogeneous passengers who could have different individual utility
functions, we need to take account for their utility into our planning. A centralized solution
would fail to serve these heterogeneous passengers when it charged them the fare greater than
their willing payments. Moreover, it is difficult to provide passengers a “promised” fixed low
meter rate in taxi sharing service a priori as the payment would be dynamically dependent on
destinations of sharing passengers and availability of taxis case by case. What is needed is a
real time protocol for passengers to submit their willing payment to participate in the Last Mile
sharing service.
Contextualizing this on the cost sharing formula (4.2), the willing payment of passenger i
is hence computed by their willing meter rate mi and the discount rate ∆i. However, asking
a passenger to specify these two values is quite impractical in an auction setting as the cost
could be minimized either by decreasing meter rate m or by increasing the discount rate ∆. To
avoid ambiguity, we consider the auction protocols in which passenger only bid on 1 value. In
this section, we propose and discuss on 2 possibilities: passengers could submit either required
discount rate ∆ or meter ratem. We show that although ∆ bidding is feasible but it is inefficient
to allocate the cost. It motivates to use meter ratem to charge passenger and decide the discount
rate for passenger later.
Given this willing payment, passenger i’s actual fare payment should then satisfy the fol-
lowing constraint (called the Individual Payment constraint):
pi ≤ misi −∆i(Bi − si). (4.4)
4.3.1 Discount rate bidding model
Consider a discount rate model in which meter rate is fixed to normal taxi meter rate, pas-
sengers will specify their required discount rate. A bid for passenger i is simply defined as
(si,∆i), (4.5)
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in which si,∆i are respectively destination and required discount for each extra travel distance
of passenger i.
Passenger i’s fare pi follows the individual and budget balance constraints
pi ≤ si −∆i(Bi − si), (4.6)
∑
i∈S
pi = T, (4.7)
We consider 2 models to calculate the cost via discount rate
1. Charge passenger directly by pi = si − ∆i(Bi − si). A single discount rate value is
determined for all passengers. To maximize compensation for additional travel distance
inconvenience, the discount rate ∆ can be raised whenever the money is still enough to
run the service ∑
i∈S
p1i =
∑
i∈S
si −∆(Bi − si) ≥ T. (4.8)
2. We adapt proportional cost formula for discount rate model. Given a priori discount rate
∆, the cost is first calculated by proportional formula then discounted by additional travel
distance.
Recall the proportional cost without discount part for passenger i is
pi =
si∑
j∈S
T. (4.9)
However, with respect to discount for additional travel distance, we need to adjust pas-
sengers fares by increasing fare of non-suffered passengers to compensate suffered pas-
sengers. Specifically we maintain a discount budget to spend on compensation aside
from trip budget T . The before-discount portion of passenger i now is
p
′
i =
si∑
j∈S
(T +
∑
j∈S
∆(Bj − sj)). (4.10)
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T +
∑
j∈S ∆(Bj − sj) is the combination of trip budget and discount budget. The final
payment of passenger i is subtracted by his/her discount part
p2i = p
′
i −∆(Bi − si) =
si∑
j∈S
(T +
∑
j∈S
∆(Bj − sj))−∆(Bi − si). (4.11)
It can be shown that this formula satisfies budget balance requirement
∑
i∈S
p2i =
∑
i∈S
[
si∑
j∈S
(T +
∑
j∈S
∆(Bj − sj))−∆(Bi − si)] (4.12)
=
∑
i∈S
[
si∑
j∈S
(T +
∑
j∈S
∆(Bj − sj))−
∑
i∈S
∆(Bi − si) (4.13)
= (T +
∑
j∈S
∆(Bj − sj))−
∑
i∈S
∆(Bi − si) (4.14)
= T. (4.15)
Drawback of discount rate
The main drawback of discount rate model is that it only takes account for inconvenience of
suffered riders but not specify a fair division for sharers. As a result, it could end up in extremis
by which a suffered passenger can get incentivized by most of cost savings in ridesharing and
leave nothing to non-suffered passenger.
Let us look at an example illustrating the weakness of the 2 methods suggested above. This
example is shown in Figure 4.1. In this example, there are only 2 passengers A and B with the
distance Depot-A:5, A-B:1, Depot-B:5.5. The solid line represents the planned trip, in which
passenger A is the first served passenger and passenger B is the second one with 0.5 extra travel
distance.
For the first formula (4.8) we need to increase ∆ = 9
p1A = 5− 9× 0 = 5 (4.16)
p1B = 5.5− 9× 0.5 = 1. (4.17)
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Although it does not violate any individual constraints with any ∆i ≤ 8, it is unfair as first
passenger A has to pay most of the trip, passenger B gets most of the monetary saving and only
needs to pay an amount.
For the second formula (4.11), there are several ∆ values which can satisfy individual con-
straints
∆ = 1 satisfies any ∆i ≤ 6
p2A = (6 + 1× 0.5)
5
5 + 5.5
− 8× 0 = 3.0952 < 5− 6× 0 (4.18)
p2B = (6 + 1× 0.5)
5.5
5 + 5.5
− 1× 0.5 = 2.9048 < 5.5− 6× 0.5 (4.19)
. . .
∆ = 9 satisfies any ∆i ≤ 9
p2A = (6 + 9× 0.5)
5
5 + 5.5
− 9× 0 = 5 ≤ 5− 9× 0 (4.20)
p2B = (6 + 9× 0.5)
5.5
5 + 5.5
− 9× 0.5 = 1 ≤ 5.5− 9× 0.5. (4.21)
This formula also can produce unfair solution for passenger A.
The reason for iniquity of above 2 discount rate models is that they can not limit discount
rate value in a reasonable range. As a result, they are not fairly distributed the service cost to all
passengers. In the next section, by meter rate bidding model, we will see that meter rate model
does not experience such problem.
4.3.2 Meter rate bidding model
We observe that meter rate is the reasonable upper bound to cap discount rate, by which
passengers will not be discounted for each unit of extra travel distance more than their willing
32
Depot 
Customer A 
Customer B 
5.5 
5 
1 
Figure 4.1: An example of routing.
payment on meter rate. With respect to this upper bound, we propose a meter rate bidding
model, where discount rate and meter rate are equal. Intuitively speaking, if passenger i is
willing to pay 1$ for each of his/her direct travel distance, he/she will get discounted by 1$
for each of his/her extra travel distance. In common sense, to use a better quality service,
corresponding to higher discount rate, you need to pay more and vice versa.
As we will show later, this simple model has the property that the minimum fare for a
passenger is easily computed by minimizing meter rate (against all other passengers)
Theorem 1. A passengers fare is directly proportional to its meter rate.
Proof. It follows the algebra transformation fact that
msi −m(Bi − si) < m′si −m′(Bi − si) (4.22)
is equivalent to
m(2si −Bi) < m′(2si −Bi) (4.23)
when m < m′ . Notice that passenger needs to pay a positive cost to use the service, in other
words 2si −Bi > 0.
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As a corollary of this theorem, the fare is guaranteed to be competitive, and minimizing
meter rate is dominant choice.
In regard to previous example in Figure 4.1, given optimal routing from Depot to A then B,
consider one possibility to charge all passengers with the same meter rate, the meter rate model
solution is
[m× 5.5−m× (6− 5.5)] +m× 5 = 6⇒ m = 6
10
(4.24)
pA = 0.6× 5 = 3 (4.25)
pB = 0.6× 5.5− 0.6× (6− 5.5) = 3. (4.26)
The meter rate solution is related to the minimizing travel distance and proportionally allo-
cated cost solution. We notice that in budget balance situation m = T
S−(B−S) , in which T is
trip travel distance, S is total direct distance demand, B is total individual trip travel distance.
Hence minimizing m is equivalent to minimizing trip travel distance and total individual extra
travel distance.
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Chapter 5
Incentive Compatible Mechanisms
In this chapter, we study and propose incentive compatible mechanisms. We first define
our mechanism as a routing and cost allocating solver. By a specific example, we show that
incentive compatibility and optimality may be mutually exclusive. It also implies that designing
incentive compatible mechanism is not trivial.
Based on auction based protocol, we propose 3 incentive compatible mechanisms:
1. Top-down mechanism is presented as a baseline when we compare incentive mecha-
nisms. It expands feasible set of served passengers by including passengers with the
order from high willing payment to low one. The fares of served passengers are com-
puted by a mathematical program to minimize meter rate. Serving procedure is cut off
at position of the first passenger fails to be added in the set. Meter rate bid value of this
first unserved passenger will be used as lower bound in optimizing model. The notion of
first unserved passenger is corresponding to notion of the second highest price passenger
in classical second price auction.
2. Bottom-up mechanism is similar to Top-down mechanism in principle of giving prece-
dence to serve passengers with high willing payment first. The difference is instead of
checking servability from passengers with higher payment to passenger with lower pay-
ment, we will check the feasibility of solution to serve a maximal number of passengers
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by a minimal charged lowest meter rate. At each iteration, if there is a violation of in-
dividual constraint (4.4) or m∗ > mi for served passenger i, we will dismiss the worst
violated passenger and solve again, otherwise we output the solution. Bottom-up mech-
anism is promising to solve more passengers than Top-down mechanism.
3. A modified version of raising cost procedure in Last Mile problem is proposed. It is
different from the normal Raising-Cost in set covering and facility location games when
instead of raising gross payment, we raise the meter rate. To speed up the algorithm, we
replace the Raising-Cost by an equivalent procedure to repeatedly solve a mathematical
program. The routing and cost allocation are essential in scheduling part of our Raising
cost mechanism.
All of these 3 mechanisms can be decomposed into 2 phases
– In phase 1, we solve a routing problem without individual payment constraints. Only
geography information of passengers’ destination are considered.
– In phase 2, after solving the routing problem, we separately check if there is any violation
of individual constraints of willing payment in outputted solution. If there is, we elim-
inate passengers in violated individual constraints and repeat the procedure from phase
1.
By following this 2 phases principle, our proposed mechanisms are proved to be incentive
compatible.
5.1 Ridesharing mechanism
Our Last Mile ridesharing system is illustrated by diagram in figure 5.1. Before arriving
at the hub, a batch of passengers will send their respective requests containing destination si
and willing payment rate mi. In addition, the number of available taxis needs to be updated.
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Based on passenger demand and taxi supply, the system computes a routing and cost allocating
solution. Each passenger will be informed with their trip Bi and payment pi from the solution.
Each taxi will be informed with assigned riders, routing solution and corresponding payments.
To engage the payments from passengers to taxis, we can develop payment methods directly
linking accounts of passengers and drivers to the center. After the confirmation of shared riders,
the money will be debitted from riders’ accounts and transferred to drivers’ accounts. The
𝑁 calling demands 
𝐾 available taxis 
Decision support 
Travel service  
with cost 
𝐵𝑖 , 𝑝𝑖 𝑖∈𝑆 
Passenger 
destination 
and willing 
payment 
𝑠𝑖 , 𝑚𝑖 𝑖=1:𝑛 
In the queue 
to serve 
Route 𝑇 and 
corresponding 
payment to 
each taxi 
Figure 5.1: Ridesharing mechanism.
problem studied in this thesis is to develop a system to provide the routing and cost allocating
solution. Specifically we want to develop mechanism defined as follows.
Definition 1. A mechanism in Last Mile vehicle sharing is a mapping f from passenger demand
set N = (si,mi) and available vehicle set K to routing solution S and vector or payment
(Bi, pi)
f : (s1,m1)× . . .× (sn,mn)→ (B1, p1)× . . .× (Bn, pn). (5.1)
Because of budget balance constraint, each taxi driver is guaranteed to be paid by at least
the amount charged for a normal (non-shared) taxi service.
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In our bidding protocol, a passenger submits the information of destination si and willing
payment rate mi. We assume passengers will not lie on their destinations. But they can manip-
ulate their willing payment value to gain benefit.
Definition 2. A mechanism is incentive compatible if passengers have no incentive to bid any
willing payment mi dishonestly.
5.2 Optimal number of served passengers mechanism
Given willing payments of participants, we propose an optimal model to provide an opti-
mistic solution, i.e. the maximum number of passengers we can serve. Based on model, we
show an example where optimality and compatibility can not happen at the same time, which
illustrates the challenge of developing incentive compatible mechanism. Furthermore, optimal
solution produced by this model will be used as an optimal benchmark for later experimental
evaluation.
In the optimal model, passengers are charged directly by their willing payment, in other
words the charged rate for passenger i, m¯i is equal to his/her submitted rate mi.
The mathematical model for this is as follows:
max
∑
i,j∈N
xij +
1
M
(
∑
i,j∈N
xijsj) (5.2)
subject to
∑
j∈N
∑
i∈N
xij[mjsj −mj(Bj − sj)] ≥
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N
xijtij, (5.3)
from constraint (3.2) to constraint (3.14) in routing model
The first term
∑
i,j∈N xij in objective function is number of served passengers. With the big
constant M , second part
∑
i,j∈N xijsj is the bias term for maximizing total direct distance of
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served demand.
Untruthfulness of Optimal Served Number Solution
Although above model gains the maximum efficiency in serving passengers given their will-
ing payments, it does not ensure a truthful protocol as some passenger could lie on their willing
payments to pay less. An example of strategic manipulation is shown in Figure 5.2. The dis-
tance matrix is presented in Table 5.1
Given 1 available vehicle, a solution serving 3 passengers would charge each passenger an
Distance Depot A B C
Depot 5 9 7
A 7 9
B 5
Table 5.1: This table shows some data
meter rate m = 5+7+5
5+(9−3)+(7−10) , which is greater than meter rate m
′
= 5+7
5+(9−3) of solution
serving only 2 passengers A and B. To gain more benefit, passenger B could lower his willing
payment on meter rate as he knows that he has advantage by bias term in objective function for
the furthest destination.
5.3 Top-down mechanism
In the Top-down mechanism and its variant Bottom-up mechanism, all served passengers
are charged by the same meter rate m, which is different from Raising-Cost procedure where
the charged meter rate m¯i can be differentiated.
Firstly, we order passengers by their submit values in a preprocessing step. We prioritize
passengers with high willing payments on meter rate to be served first. Wining players should
have higher willing payments than losing players.
Top-down mechanism initializes with the smallest set of feasible solutions of the high will-
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Figure 5.2: An example of Untruthful Bidding.
ing payment passengers. Then at each step, it includes an additional passenger with the highest
willing payment in the remaining set. To find the routing solution for a set of passengers, Top-
down solves a mathematical program minimizing the charged meter rate m. The meter rate
solution is bounded by the bid value of first unserved passenger, i.e. the highest bid value in
the remaining set. This lower bound plays a role to protect the mechanism from overbidding.
The highest bid value of passengers in the unserved set is equivalent to the second highest bid
in second price auction.
The detail of the Top-down mechanism is described by Algorithm 2. In the first phase from
line 23 to line 29, it repeatedly expands the potential set from empty until a feasible solution is
found. In the second phase from line 31 to line 37, it continues to expand the potential set until
there is no feasible solution for expanded set. Notice that an expanding procedure is carried
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out by decreasing order of mi. At each iteration, after adding the next highest willing payment
passenger i into the served passengers set Si = Si−1 and set the lower bound ml = mi+1 by
the first passenger outside of Si, Solve1(Si,ml) will return solution m∗ for Si with constraint
m ≤ mi by solving a mathematical program Solve1 with S = Si:
Solve1(N,ml) : m
∗ = minm (5.4)∑
i,j∈S
xijtij ≤
∑
i,j∈S
[msj −m(Bj − sj)] (5.5)
∑
i∈S
xij = 1,∀j ∈ S (5.6)
∑
i,j∈S
xij = |S| (5.7)
ml ≤ m ≤ mi,∀i ∈ S (5.8)
from constraint (3.2) to constraint (3.14) in routing model
In budget balance constraint (5.5), all served passengers are charged with the same meter rate
m. Constraints (5.6) and (5.7) require to serve all passengers in the given set S. Constraint (5.8)
indicates them’s lower bound and individual constraint checking. Note that in Top-down mech-
anism, individual constraint checking can be incorporated into mathematics program, which is
not feasible in other incentive compatible mechanism.
ml is value of the first unserved passenger, which is set in lines 24 and 32.
If there is no feasible solution, which is m∗ =∞ in line 35, i will be considered as cutoff point
and we output solution of Si−1.
Figure 5.3 shows an example how Top-down mechanism works. Served passengers are
1, 2, 3, 4, 5 as they are the 5 highest willing payment passengers that service can serve, there is
no solution to serve 6 passengers from 1 to 6. We cut off at passenger 6 value because he is the
first unserved passenger. m6 will be used as the lower bound in the mathematics program to
minimize m: m5 ≥ m∗ ≥ mbound = m6. In this case, the charged meter rate is minimized to
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be equal to lower bound mbound = m6. We do not charge served passengers by meter rate less
than m6 otherwise it does not guarantee the incentive compatibility.
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Figure 5.3: An example of Top-down mechanism.
Algorithm 2: Top-down algorithm
input : Set n passengers N = {(si,∆i)}i
output: Set S of served passengers and their costs
22 Initialize: S0 ← ∅;
23 for i← 1 to n do
24 ml = mi+1;
25 Si = Si−1 ∪ i;
26 m∗ = Solve1(Si,ml);
27 if m∗ 6=∞ then
28 break;
29 end
30 end
31 for j = i+ 1 to n do
32 ml = mj+1;
33 Sj = Sj−1 ∪ j;
34 m∗ = Solve1(Sj,ml);
35 if m∗ =∞ then
36 output S = Sj−1;
37 end
38 end
Theorem 2. The Top-down mechanism is incentive compatible.
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Figure 5.4: Manipulating bidding values
Proof. For unserved passengers, underbidding munderbidding < mpassenger ≤ mbound would not
help as they are not served because of too low willing payment. Overbidding of unserved pas-
sengersmbound ≤ moverbidding could let passenger into the served passengers set but at the same
time it would run a risk of overpayment: mpassenger ≤ mbound < m∗ ≤ moverbidding.
For served passengers, overbidding obviously does not change the solution m∗ as they are still
above cutoff position. Similarly, underbidding of served passengers does not change the solu-
tion if m∗ ≤ munderbidding < mpassenger. In additional, underbidding could dismiss passenger
from service when their bidding is lower than the threshold of feasibility.
5.4 Bottom-up mechanism
This mechanism is similar to Top-down in that it seeks to serve high willing payment pas-
sengers. But instead of expanding the served passengers by high willing payment order from
an empty set, we gradually eliminate low willing payment passenger who is the worst violated
passenger in individual constraint, which has the lowest bidding willing payment, and solve
problem again.
The Bottom-up mechanism is based on a simple principle: include all demands initially,
compute the assignment considering the destinations but not the meter rates. If a feasible cost
allocation cannot be found from the particular assignment, the lowest paying passenger (in
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terms of submitted meter rate) will be eliminated from consideration and the assignment is
recomputed. The process continues until we identify a feasible combination of assignment and
cost allocation. For this reason, we call it the Bottom-up mechanism.
Algorithm 3: The Bottom-up algorithm.
Input: (N, {(si,mi)}i∈N)
Output: (S,m∗)
39 S ← ∅, ml = 0
40 while N 6= ∅ do
41 (m∗, S) = Solve2(N,ml)
42 if mini∈Smi < m∗ then
43 ml = mini∈Smi
44 N ← N \ {arg mini∈Smi}
45 else
46 N ← ∅
47 end
48 end
49 return (S,m∗)
Assuming that the auctioneer has collected the set of all bids {(si,mi)}i∈N from all passen-
gers in set N . The Bottom-up clearing process is illustrated in Algorithm 3. The mechanism
first calls the mathematical program Solve2 to obtain a candidate assignment. For each ob-
tained assignment, we check whether individual payment constraint is violated for the lowest
paying passenger (line 42). If a violation is detected, the lowest paying passenger is removed
from set N , and the lower bound on the meter rate (ml) is also updated (line 43). The above
process repeats until an assignment that satisfies all individual payment constraints is found. At
termination, the mechanism reports the set of passengers to be served (including their cluster
and service orders) and the universal meter rate (m∗) to be paid by all served passengers.
Solve2(N,ml) : m
∗ = minm (5.9)
subject to∑
i,j∈N
xij tij ≤
∑
i,j∈N
xij (msj −m(Bj − sj)) , (5.10)
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Figure 5.5: An example of Bottom-Up Mechanism
∑
i,j∈N
xij = min{|N |, |K| ×Q}, (5.11)
m ≥ ml, (5.12)
together with constraints (3.2) – (3.14) in routing model.
An example of Bottom-up algorithm is shown in Figure 5.5. The mechanism begin with
trying to serve min{N,K × K} = 9 passengers. There is no feasible solution, therefore we
eliminate lowest willing payment passenger 9 and resolve again. In second iteration, a solution
to solve 8 passengers is found but it violates individual constraint of passenger 8, therefore we
need to dismiss passenger 8 from the potential set. Finally, there is no violation in solution to
served 7 passengers, therefore we terminate and output the solution.
Note that the mechanism terminates when we eliminated all passengers in N or we find a non-
violated solution.
Theorem 3. The Bottom-up mechanism is incentive compatible.
Proof. A passenger’s bid contains two parts: the destination and the desired meter rate. Since
this is a shared door-to-door service, a passenger should not cheat on the destination, and thus
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our analysis will focus only on the meter rate.
In the first phase of the mechanism, mathematics program Solve2 is solved and selected
destinations are assigned to clusters with service orders. If a passenger is not chosen in the
first phase, truth telling is not an issue as this passenger’s bid will not change the outcome.
Suppose the passenger is selected in phase one, but eliminated in phase two because mi < m∗,
he will not want to raise his bid, since if he manages to stay on by raising bid, the new m∗,
which originally is mi, will be higher than mi . The lower bound guarantees that he cannot be
served if any bid higher than his value is eliminated. Lowering his bid in this case makes no
difference.
Finally, if a passenger stays on in both phases one and two, raising the bid makes no dif-
ference, since he is already chosen, and he will be asked to pay m∗ regardless of his own bid.
Lowering the bid is also not desirable, since the charged rate, m∗, is the minimized meter rate,
and if the passenger wants to benefit from the lower cost, he has to bid less thanm∗, but this will
result in him being eliminated instead. Therefore, in all cases, bid the true meter rate will not
cause harm, and in two out of four cases, the bidder will perform strictly better than lying.
5.5 Raising cost procedure in Last Mile vehicle routing prob-
lem
The raising-cost mechanism is assumed to receive identical inputs as the Bottom-up mech-
anism. The main idea of the mechanism is to select subsets of confirmed passengers iterative
by gradually raising the clearing meter cost. Served passengers can thus have different me-
ter rates. Similar clearing techniques have been utilized in constructing incentive-compatible
mechanisms in other settings such as set covering and facility location game [14].
Algorithm 4 is a straightforward implementation of the raising-cost mechanism. In each
iteration, the standing meter rate (that can be applied to unserved passengers) is increased by
a small amount , and passengers having meter rates lower than m∗ are then removed from
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Algorithm 4: The raising-cost mechanism.
Input: (N, {(si,mi)}i∈N , )
Output: (S, {m¯i}i∈S)
50 t = 0, St ← ∅, Nt ← N,mt = 0
51 while N 6= ∅ do
52 mt = mt + 
53 for i ∈ N do
54 if mt > mi then
55 Nt ← Nt \ i
56 end
57 end
58 St+1 = Solve3(St, Nt,m
t)
59 if St+1 6= ∅ then
60 for i ∈ St+1 ∩Nt do
61 Nt ← Nt \ i
62 m¯i = m
t
63 end
64 Nt+1 ← Nt
65 t = t+ 1
66 end
67 end
68 return (St, {m¯i}i∈S)
consideration. Given the sets of served and unserved passengers and the current meter rate m∗,
Solve3 is then invoked to find the set of served passengers. For new passengers served in this
iteration, their meter rates (m¯i) are fixed at m∗. Note that we only need a feasible solution from
Solve3, thus it is a constraint satisfaction problem.
Solve3(S,N,m
∗) :∑
i,j∈N∪S
xijtij ≤
∑
i∈N∪S
[∑
j∈N
xij (m
∗sj −m∗(Bj − sj))
+
∑
k∈S
xik (m¯ksk − m¯k(Bk − sk))
]
, (5.13)
∑
i∈N∪S
xij = 1,∀j ∈ S, (5.14)
∑
i∈N∪S
∑
j∈N
xij ≥ 1, (5.15)
together with constraints (3.2) – (3.14) in routing model.
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In Raising-Cost algorithm 4, we have to continuously raise and check the meter rate by indi-
vidual payment constraints until we find a new solution or any violation. If there is a violation in
line 54, it will be removed from the remaining potential setNt in line 55. Solve3(St, Nt,m∗) in
line 58 will find and return a solution of constraint satisfaction problem with constraints (5.17)
to (5.22) to find an additional passenger in set Nt of remaining unserved passengers, if there is
a solution found, charged meter rate of new served passengers will be fixed by current m∗. A
passenger is removed from remain passengers set Nt+1 if his/her bidding value is violated (line
55) or he/she is the new served passenger (line 61). If there is no solution found, we increase
the meter rate m∗ and solve again.
Instead of gradually raising the cost by small increment , due to special structure of vehicle
routing problem, we can ”jump” through a bigger increment from current solution to the next
solution by a mathematical program to find the minimum m to serve at least 1 passenger in
remaining set N. The number of iterations therefore reduced from O(1/) to N .
The modified algorithm for Last Mile problem is described by Algorithm 5.
The main difference is instead of gradually Raising-Cost by many intermediate steps, in line
74, Solve4(St, Nt,ml) solves a mathematical model to find the minimum m∗ for remaining
passengers Nt who are still unserved. If a new routing solution is found, we need to check
whether there is any violation for the new served passengers in line 77. A passenger is removed
from remain passengers set Nt+1 if his/her bidding value is violated (line 78) or he/she is the
new served passenger (line 81).
Solve4(S,N,ml) : m
∗ = minm (5.16)
subject to
∑
i,j∈N∪S
xijtij ≤
∑
j∈N
∑
i∈N∪S
xij[msj −m(Bj − sj)] (5.17)
+
∑
j∈S
∑
i∈N∪S
xij[m¯jsj − m¯j(Bj − sj)] (5.18)
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Algorithm 5: Modified Raising Cost Mechanism in taxi sharing
Input: Set n passengers N = {(si,mi)}i
Output: Set S of served passengers and their costs
69 t = 0;
70 St ← ∅;
71 Nt ← N;
72 ml = 0;
73 while Nt 6= ∅ do
74 (m∗, St+1) = Solve4(St, Nt,ml);
75 if St+1 6= ∅ then
76 for i ∈ St+1 ∩Nt do
77 if mi < m∗ then
78 Nt = Nt \ i;
79 go to 73;
80 else
81 Nt = Nt \ i;
82 end
83 end
84 Nt+1 = Nt;
85 ml = m
∗;
86 t = t+ 1;
87 go to 73;
88 else
89 output S;
90 end
91 end
∑
i∈N∪S
xij = 1,∀j ∈ S (5.19)
m ≥ ml (5.20)∑
i∈N∪S,j∈N
xij ≥ 1 (5.21)
from constraint (3.2) to constraint (3.14) in routing model (5.22)
The equivalence of 2 mechanisms is proven by
Theorem 4. Algorithm 5 returns the same solution with Algorithm 4.
Proof. We show the proof by induction. Assume that until iteration k, solution of Algorithm
5 is still the same with solution of Algorithm 4. It is necessary that the next feasible solutions
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of these 2 algorithms are also identical. Denote mk, m
′
k, mk+1 and m
′
k+1 as solutions of 4, 5
at step k, 4, 5 at step k+1 respectively. By induction hypothesis, mk = m
′
k. By Algorithm 4,
mk+1 will be raised therefore greater than mk. By Algorithm 5, m
′
k is the lower bound in next
iteration solving, so m′k < m
′
k+1. If mk+1 < m
′
k+1, solution corresponding to m
′
k+1 is not the
optimal one; if mk+1 > m
′
k+1 the normal Raising-Cost will found the solution of m
′
k+1 before
mk+1, both are contradiction. So mk+1 = m
′
k+1.
In Raising-Cost procedure, we maintain 2 sets of passengers at each iteration, set of served
passengers S with their fixed meter rate m¯i and set of the remaining unserved passengers N
from which we need to find a solution minimizing m to serve at least one additional passenger.
Notice that we do not maximum number of served passengers but minimize meter rate m,
therefore there could be the case that only 1 additional passenger is added into served set S in
each iteration.
An example of Raising cost mechanism is shown in Figure 5.6. The charged meter rate is
raised over iterations. Solution for passengers 1, 5 are found in the first iteration with meter
rate 0.52. Then the in second iteration passengers 2, 7, 9 are served with the higher meter rate
0.55. Finally passengers 3, 4 are served in the third iteration with the highest meter rate 0.56.
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Figure 5.6: An example of Raising Cost Mechanism.
Again, notice that we do not include individual constraint in our mathematical program so
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we need to check after solving if there is any individual constraint violation for the new served
passengers in set N. In post processing, if any individual constraint violation is found, we will
dismiss all violated passengers and solve again.
Theorem 5. The raising meter rate cost mechanism is incentive compatible.
Proof. The incentive compatibility property of the raising-cost mechanism is inherent in its
procedure. The meter rate is initialized at 0, and gradually increases at the interval of . If
a passenger is not selected in the final served set, lowering his bid will not change his status.
Raising his bid could delay his elimination to later iteration, and this passenger might be chosen
in these additional iterations, however, it is not desirable as he will be paying meter rate higher
than his tolerance.
If a passenger is selected in the final served set, raising his bid makes no difference. Let
this passenger’s bid be mj , mt = mj , and let m¯j be the meter rate that is actually charged. If
m¯j = mj , it is not desirable to lower the bid, since the passenger will be eliminated in iteration
(t − 1). If m¯j < mj , lowering the bid to the range of [m¯j,mj) makes no difference, since
this passenger will still be charged m¯j . If the new bid is lower than m¯j , the passenger will be
eliminated and this will not be desirable as well.
Therefore, in all cases, bidding trustfully does no harm, while deviating from the true meter
rate will cause undesirable outcomes in three out of six cases.
5.6 Optimal meter rate m∗ search
The mathematical model in (5.4), (5.9) and (5.16) in fact is not linear because constraints
(5.5), (5.10) and (5.18) contain the term m × Bj , which is product of 2 continuous variables.
The decomposition is difficult in this case. To the best of our knowledge, there is no available
method to decompose product of 2 real variables in linear programming. Hence in this work,
we propose an efficient hill climbing algorithm to optimizem, in which we repeatedly decrease
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mt+1 = m
∗
t −  with m∗t denoting solution in previous iteration.  is the increment to move so-
lution out of a local optimum, however it does not mean that the next solution will be improved
only by .
In the Top-down mechanism, we can choose the start point for hill climbing process by the
lowest bid For Bottom-up and Raising cost mechanism. Then we find the first feasible point by
incremental search in bidding passenger values.
The quality of our hill climbing algorithm is determined by decrement 
Theorem 6. Solution m∗ of hill climbing with decrement  is a -approximation of optimal
solution mopt, in other words
|m∗ −mopt| ≤ . (5.23)
Proof. We prove the theorem by contradiction. We have m∗ is the final solution of our hill
climbing search. Assume |mopt −m∗| > , there is a solution for upper bound m = m∗ − , it
means that the solution with meter rate m∗ is not the final solution of our hill climbing search,
which is a contradiction.
To choose a heuristic replacement for nonlinear mathematical programming, firstly we ob-
serve that
Theorem 7. Solution of the objective function m∗ = minm = min T
S−(B−S) is one Pareto
solution of bi-objective functions minT and minB
Proof. This observation can be proved by contradiction. With a little abuse of notation, we
use S as total direct distance demands of served passengers and T (S), B(S) as total trip travel
distance and total individual trip travel distance corresponding to that solution. If there was a
solution S ′ dominating S∗ of objective function minm, we would have T (S ′) ≤ T (S∗) and
B(S
′
) ≤ B(S∗ with at least one of them is strict inequality, then m(S ′) = T (S
′
)
S′−(B(S′ )−S′ ) <
T (S∗)
S∗−(B(S∗)−S∗) = m
∗, which is contradict to assumption that S∗ is the optimal solution for
minm.
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As the decomposition of m = T
S−(B−S) is hard, we try to find optimal m by repeatedly
solving alternative mathematical programming with decreasing m. Notice solution of m∗ is a
Pareto set of minT and minB, we heuristically use objective function minT + B which also
returns a Pareto solution of minT , minB.
In each iteration in Meter Rate Search Algorithm 6, given a m value as the upper bound
parameter from search procedure, we solve the MIP
A : min
∑
i,j∈N
xijtij +
∑
i∈N
Bi (5.24)
s.t.
constraints of normal model
Notice that if passenger i is not served, to minimize (5.24) Bi will be forced into 0.
The m∗ = T
S−(B−S) < m value found by solution of (5.24) will be used as the upper bound
parameter for next iteration. If m∗ = m, we need to decrease search bound by the decrement
 for the next iteration. The algorithm terminates and the best solution found is output when
there is no more available solution for current upper bound meter rate m.
Algorithm 6: Meter Rate Search Algorithm
92 while m > mlowerbound do
93 Solve A to find m∗;
94 if no solution then
95 output current solution found in previous iteration;
96 else
97 if m∗ < m then
98 m = m∗;
99 else
100 m = m− ;
101 end
102 end
103 end
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5.6.1 Hill climbing search experimental results
We carry out some test cases to verify efficiency of our algorithm. We find optimal meter
rate m∗ solutions for 10 instances of 20 passengers and 1 taxi with capacity 4, so the size
of search space is
(
20
4
)
= 20!
4!16!
= 4845 with start point m = 1. We measure number of
iterations, runtime and quality of solution with different decrement value , represented in
Figure 5.7, 5.8, 5.9 respectively. We see that the average number of iterations is only 5.7 even
with the small decrement value  = 0.0001, while to find the optimal solution m∗ = 0.41
there are 1−0.41
0.0001
= 5900 intervals of  = 0.0001. When  increases, number of iteration and
runtime decrease, which is predictable. We observe after  = 0.01, quality of solutions reflected
by meter rate value m∗ are quickly reduced. Solution of  = 0.01 is similar to solution of
 = 0.0001 but the runtime is better, hence in our experiments in next section, we choose the
 = 0.01.
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Chapter 6
Experimental Results
In this chapter, we study the effectiveness and efficiency of our proposed mechanisms by a
series of experiments. Our experiments are established by 2 sets of data
• Synthetic data in which destinations are randomly generated in a square with depot as
the center.
• Real data of Last Mile travel demand of passengers collected from Ang Mo Kio MRT
Station in Singapore. We consider a peak hour from 6pm to 7pm and batches of passen-
gers in time intervals of 3 minutes.
6.1 Synthetic data
In the synthetic set of data, passengers’ destinations are generated in the square with edge
length of 14 and depot in the center, willing payment on meter rate of each passenger query
is generated uniformly in range [0.5,1]. We carry out experiment for 3 set of parameters:
varying passenger numbers, varying taxi numbers and varying willing payment range. Each
plotted result point is an average over solutions of 10 instances. We consider 3 metrics: number
of served passengers
∑
i,j∈N xij , total direct distance demand
∑
i,j xijsj and total surplus,
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i.e. the difference between willing payment and real charged payment of served passengers∑
i,j∈N xij(mj − m¯j)× (2× sj −Bj).
6.1.1 Varying number of passengers
In the first experiment set shown in Figures 6.1, 6.2, we observe results of mechanisms when
the the number of passengers varies from 8 to 25. Figure 6.1 shows the number of the served
passengers in solutions of different mechanisms. Figure 6.2 is the result in the total direct
distance demand of served passengers. We see that results in these 2 metrics are consistent
with each other in comparison of qualities of different mechanisms. The total direct distance
increases along with the increment of number of served passengers. We observe when the
number of passengers increases, Raising cost and Bottom-up Mechanism solutions qualities
are closer to Optimal solution.
In all instances, the Top-Down mechanism runs as a baseline with the worst quality solution.
When number of passengers is small, the quality of Raising cost mechanism dominates Bottom-
up. When the number is large above 17 passengers, Bottom-up mechanism shows better result
than Raising cost mechanism.
Figure 6.7 shows the result for total surplus of served passengers. By the result, we can see
that Raising Cost by differentiating passengers’ payments is the most beneficial mechanism
for served passengers. Raising Cost produces the largest surplus, following is Bottom-Up and
lowest is Top-down mechanism.
6.1.2 Varying number of vehicles
For second experiment, given 20 passengers we vary number of available vehicles in depot
from 1 to 10 vehicles. Result for number of served passenger is shown in Figures 6.4 and result
for total direct distance of served passenger is shown in Figure 6.5.
Similar to previous experiment on varying number of passengers, Top-down solution works
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Figure 6.1: Number of served passengers: with increasing demand
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Figure 6.2: Total direct distance of served passengers: with increasing demand
as a lower bound in all cases.
The gap between incentive compatible mechanisms and optimal numbers of served passen-
gers is widening when the number of vehicles increases. It is due to the fact that with more
vehicles, the feasible solution set size, which is equal to
(N
S
)
, decreases with more compulsive-
ness in serving passengers.
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Figure 6.3: Total surplus of served passengers: with increasing demand
In respect to surplus values, when the number of vehicles is greater than 7, Bottom-Up and
Top-down solution are closer to the top solution produced by RaisingCost mechanism.
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Figure 6.4: Number of served passengers: with increasing demand: with increasing fleet size
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Figure 6.5: Total direct distance of served passengers: with increasing fleet size
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Figure 6.6: Total surplus of served passengers: with increasing fleet size
6.1.3 Varying range of bid values
In this experiment, we observe solution quality with varying bidding behaviour with mea-
surement of number of served passengers and corresponding total direct distance. The experi-
ment is set up by 20 passengers 5 taxis, bidding values of passengers are generated from 4 range
[0.5− 1.0], [0.6− 1.0], [0.7− 1.0], [0.8− 1.0], [0.9− 1.0]. When the lower bound of bid values
60
increases, meaning bidders are willing to pay more money, solution qualities of our incen-
tive compatible mechanisms Bottom-Up and Raising Cost are improved. These improvements
are shown in both number of served passengers and total direct distance metrics. Among 2
mechanisms, Bottom-Up mechanism shows better improvement by increasing bid values with
narrower gap converging to Optimal Number mechanisms. After first improvement at range
[0.6− 1.0], Raising Cost solutions cannot improve further.
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Figure 6.7: Number of served passengers: with increasing bid values
6.1.4 Local Search and Exact Solution
To verify the efficiency of applying local search algorithm into mechanisms, we compare
performance of local search and exact methods in synthetic data in which we vary number of
passengers.
Results for this experimental comparison of local search and exact solutions are shown in
Figure 6.9 for the number of served passengers measure, Figure 6.10 for the total direct distance
of served passengers measure and Figure 6.11 for total surplus of served passengers measure.
In all metrics, local search solutions are almost identical to the exact solution for Bottom-up
mechanism. On the other hand, local search and exact solutions in Raising cost mechanism are
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Figure 6.8: Total direct distance of served passengers: with increasing bid value
different from each other. In respect to total number and direct distance of served passengers,
when the number of demands is small (from 8 to 16), some local search solutions are better
than exact solutions. The reason is that exact solution provides better surplus for passengers,
so other quantities might be traded-off. The surplus result is shown in Figure 6.11. While exact
solutions provide more surplus than local search solution, local search algorithm shows better
result in total direct distance and number of served passengers.
Even exact solutions promise better quality in different solution metrics, they are not scal-
able with large instances. Size of MIP model in exact method is, in fact, exponential with
number of passengers. When the number of calling demands is greater than 29, the exact meth-
ods run for 1000 to 6000 seconds on average to output solutions. Meanwhile, runtime of local
search algorithms is limited within 1 minute for these instances.
6.2 Ang Mo Kio data analysis
The purpose of this analysis is to choose a suitable mechanism and algorithm to implement
in a real public transport hub with real Last Mile demand. In this part, we will begin with
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Figure 6.10: Total direct distance of served passengers: with increasing demand
experiments to compare local search and exact method in Bottom-up and Raising cost mech-
anisms. In all cases, Bottom-up mechanism with local search algorithm is shown to produce
optimal solutions in short runtime. We choose this Bottom-up local search method to analyze
large scale instances. We observe that these Bottom-up solutions can serve almost all calling
demands in the data set.
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Figure 6.11: Total surplus of served passengers: with increasing demand
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Figure 6.12: Runtime of algorithms: with increasing demand
6.2.1 Local and exact solution with varying number of passengers
Varying number of passengers instances are extracted from Ang Mo Kio data. Each solution
result is the average of 10 Last Mile demands from 10 consecutive time intervals of 3 minutes.
In this experiment, willing payment of passengers in this data is fixed by value of 0.7.
Solution quality is measured by number of served passenger, their total direct distance, sur-
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plus and cost saving. In all instances local search solution and exact solution is almost identical
in Bottom-up mechanism. On the other hand, in Raising cost mechanism, local search solu-
tions are different from exact solutions, specifically it sometimes may serve more passengers
and direct distance demands in small scale problem (less than 14 passengers).
In respect to total surplus of served passengers, Raising cost mechanism with exact solutions
provides the most surplus to passengers among all methods, followed by Raising cost mecha-
nism with local search solutions. Bottom-up mechanism cannot optimize value of this surplus
metric.
In addition, we measure the cost saving which is the difference between normal travel cost if
all served passengers travel alone by single taxis and the ridesharing travel cost:
∑
i,j∈N xijsj−∑
i,j∈N xijtij . Bottom-up solution shows better result in this cost saving metric in comparison
with Raising cost solution. Notice that this value is different from surplus. It is proportional to
total saving in travel distance while surplus is total saving in utility.
The threshold for scalability of exact method in Ang Mo Kio data is 19 passengers. For
instances with passenger number equal or above 19 need, the average runtime is above 1000
seconds, which make the solution computation infeasible in real time system.
By this experimental comparison, with purpose to maximize number of served passengers
and the direct distance demands, we decide to focus on Bottom-up mechanism to implement in
Ang Mo Kio transportation station. To solve the scale problem, we use local search algorithm
whose solution quality is shown close to exact solution. The next 2 follow-up experiments are
designed for Bottom-up mechanism with local search algorithm.
6.2.2 Varying bid values
To prove the effectiveness of ridesharing in real data, the following experiments are designed
such that the willing payment of passengers increases from 0.5 to 0.9 and ratio of Last Mile
demand calling the service increases from 1 to 19 percents.
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Figure 6.13: Number of served passengers: with increasing demand of Ang Mo Kio data
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Figure 6.14: Total direct distance of served passengers: with increasing demand of Ang Mo
Kio data
Results are shown in Figure 6.18 for the number of served passengers measure and Figure
6.19 for the total direct distance of served passengers measure with the diagonal blue line is
number of calling demands. From these results, we observe that when the number of calling
demands increases, it is more likely to serve all passengers. When the ratio of participating
passengers is above 13 percent, almost all passengers are served.
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Figure 6.15: Total surplus of served passengers: with increasing demand of Ang Mo Kio data
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Figure 6.16: Total cost saving of served passengers: with increasing demand of Ang Mo Kio
data
The number of served passengers is increased if passengers are willing to pay more. When
the willing payment of passengers is 0.9, almost all passengers are served.
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Figure 6.18: Number of served passengers: with increasing participation ratio and varying
willing payment
6.2.3 Large number of participating passengers
The purpose of this final experiment is to verify the quality of solution of Bottom-up mech-
anism with local search algorithm in large scale instance of Ang Mo Kio demands.
The results are plotted in Figure 6.20 for the number of served passengers measure and
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Figure 6.21 for the total direct distance of served passengers measure. It is inferred from this
result that when the ratio of participation increases, the average number of missed passengers
decreases. When only 10 percent Last Mile demands call for the service, average number of
missed passengers is greater than 2. From 20 percent ratio value, number of missed passengers
is smaller than 0.5. The reason for this is when more passengers join the service, it is more
possible for more passengers to have close proximity in geographic locations.
69
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Number of calling Demands 19.65 39.95 60.00 80.25 100.50 120.60 140.55 160.70 180.90 200.55
Number of Served Passengers 17.45 39.70 59.75 79.90 100.05 120.10 139.95 160.00 180.10 200.45
0.00
50.00
100.00
150.00
200.00
250.00
To
ta
l N
um
be
r o
f S
er
ve
d 
Pa
ss
en
ge
rs
  
Participation Ratio 
Number of calling Demands
Number of Served Passengers
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Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Work
7.1 Mechanism study in Last Mile Risharing problem
In this thesis, we study mechanisms that enable Last Mile non-dedicated taxi ridesharing.
Our main contribution is to provide a framework for route planning and fair cost sharing. In
the operational aspect, we develop a MIP and local search model to solve the specific case
of the problem. In the game-theoretic and microeconomics aspect, we propose a cost sharing
formula and different incentive compatible mechanisms, namely Top-down, Bottom-up and
Raising cost. The efficiency and effectiveness of our proposed mechanisms and algorithms are
carefully investigated by a series of experiments on synthetic and real (Ang Mo Kio) data set
in different metrics. Based on experimental results that compare different methods, with the
focus on fast response solution to maximize number of served demands, we decide to choose
Bottom-up mechanism with local search algorithm to analyze the set of real (Ang Mo Kio)
data. It can be concluded from these experiments that a ridesharing service can be effectively
and efficiently solve Last Mile demands.
Although our work is on mechanisms for a Last Mile non-dedicated taxi sharing system, it
can be extended to other systems. The simplest extension can be implemented by using other
mode of transport different from non-dedicated taxis with fixed capacity to solve Last Mile
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demands, e.g. minibuses or vans. However, the extension to heterogeneous capacity of vehicle
can trade-off the efficiency in runtime of our MIP model for routing problem. Further extension
can be drawn out of ridesharing application, in other game-theoretic problems such as facility
location game or set cover game, our framework can be applied to recover the complete budget
balance.
7.2 Future work on user interface and usability
In this thesis, we do not consider problems of user interface and feedback in implement-
ing a ridesharing service. However, they are important factors for success for any real-time
passenger-centric service such as ours. The first user interface question is how we may im-
plement a software application interface to facilitate interaction between passengers and the
bidding system. It is not easy for first time user to specify their willing payment on an unfa-
miliar notion of the meter rate. In second problem, we need to adapt the model based on real
psychological utility evaluation on the service of passengers. Wrong estimation of utility func-
tion can undermine effectiveness of the service. Hence what is needed is an indepth behaviorial
study to understand the behavior of passengers.
The linear cost sharing formula proposed in this thesis is a simple baseline for implemen-
tation which allows problem to be solved by MIP methods. The framework can be adapted to
other more complex cost sharing formulas.
To implement a Last Mile taxi sharing service, we can utilize existing mobile and web
communication interface and database platforms such as [2], [1],[3]. An additional information
element for willing payment can be simply embedded in request tube in current mobile or
web based software applications. However, auction based protocols can be difficult for first
time passengers in trying to determine their bid values. Tips of supportive information and
suggestion for passengers are necessary. It is infeasible to explain detailed theoretical principles
underlying operating mechanism. so the information presented should be brief but useful.
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I suggest that the following information should be displayed:
• Passengers will be served with priority based on their willing payment on meter rate. This
is the simple and intuitive rule for passengers participating in an auction based protocol.
• As in many route planning app, an approximate comparison among different modes of
transport with Last Mile taxi sharing should be provided. It provides a bounded esti-
mation for opportunity cost to use the taxi sharing service. For example, if the public
transportation cost cp, travel time of public transportation Bp, normal taxi cost 1, direct
travel time of normal taxi s, the bounded taxi meter rate would follow
cp ≤ m(2s−Bp) (7.1)
or
m ≥ cp
2s−Bp , (7.2)
in which the RHS is lower bound for meter rate willing payment to use taxi sharing
service.
Furthermore, the willing payment rate can be represented as a discrete value instead of
continuous value. Thereby, passengers can choose an option in a set of possible suggested
rate.
• History of past meter rate charge. It can give passengers an intuition of how system is
operated and help them to decide which willing payment should be bid to get served.
• An explicit information of routing and cost allocation solution from the system. For
credibility, passengers should be informed of their trips before they confirm/accept.
• Although information in theoretical principles can be redundant for regular passengers,
we should provide an access to detailed version of explanation. It would make the service
more credible if passengers are content with the information presented.
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• Feedback is prevalent in current ridesharing software applications. We could solicit com-
ments about the fairness of cost sharing from the user of the system.
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